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I. INTRODUCTION

[If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively
calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free
thought-not free thought for
2 those who agree with us but freedom
for the thought that we hate.
The most frightening and disturbing depictions [on a wall in a
school's playing field] ... were those that threatened violence against
one of our senior black students. He was drawn, in cartoon figure,
identified by his name, and his initials, and by the name of his mother.
Directly to the right of his head was a bullet, and farther to the right
was a gun with its barrel directed toward the head. Under the drawing
of the student, three Ku Klux Klansmen were depicted, one of whom
of
was saying that the student "dies." Next to the gun was a drawing
'
a burning cross under which was written "Kill the Tarbaby.A
When the Supreme Court decided unanimously in 1992 that a St. Paul "hate
4
speech" ordinance ran afoul of the First Amendment in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul,

lAssociate Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Cortland.
B.C.L. 1978, U. College Dublin; J.D. 1981, Incorporated Law Society of Ireland; Ph.D.
1988, Syracuse University.
2
United States v. Schwimmer, 279 US. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting),
overruledon othergroundsby, Grovard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
3
Charles Lawrence IMI,
If He Hollers Let Him Go: RegulatingRacist Speech On Campus,
1990 DuKE L. J. 431,460 (describing one act of hate speech in a letter dated May 17,1988,
from Dulany 0. Bennett to parents, alumni and friends of the Wilmington Friends

School).
4112 S.Ct. 2538 (1992). The ordinance prohibited placing on "public or private
property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not
limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
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it revealed an important fissure in the logic that has permeated free speech
decisions over the last 50 years. The stark contrast between Justice Antonin
Scalia's majority opinion and the concurrences 5 of Justices Byron White, Sandra
Day O'Connor, John Paul Stevens and Harry Blackmun indicates that no one
theory of the application of the free speech guarantee yet commands
widespread support. 6 Indeed the R.A.V. decision, aside from being riddled
with ironies, is a classic example of a court united in judgment and divided in
understanding.
For scholars of the First Amendment this case is an excellent example of the
dilemmas posed by many of the doctrines created by the Court. While Justice
Scalia proposes an elaborate and novel understanding of the limits of free
speech regulation, Justice White responds with an assertion that Scalia's
reasoning is "transparently wrong,"7 and that his opinion is a "radical revision
of First Amendment law."8 According to Justice Stevens, the majority opinion
is no more than "an adventure in a doctrinal wonderland."9 Part II of this paper
examines the attacks made by Justices White and Stevens against the majority
opinion. Part II.A demonstrates a critical weakness in the majority opinion,
one that reveals a perverse use of precedent by Justice Scalia. Part III.B
demonstrates another weakness of the majority opinion: How fighting words
are apparently more deserving of government protection than commercial
speech. The fourth and fifth parts of the paper analyze the fundamental issues
raised in the preceding discussion with a particular focus on the unpredictable
standards used by Justice Scalia in free speech cases. The conclusion explains
why the categorical approach to the First Amendment taken by the Supreme
Court in R.A.V is untenable.
II. CONCURRING CRITIQUES

The concurrences in R.A.V deserve close consideration for at least two
reasons. The first is that Justice Scalia's analysis became the majority opinion
by a 5-4 margin. If the Court should change course on this issue in the near
future, the reasoning espoused by the concurring Justices will likely lead the
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender." Id. at 2541 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 292.02 (1990)).
SJustices Blackmun and O'Connor joined in Justice White's concurring opinion,
withJustice Stevens joining in Part I(A) of Justice White's concurrence. Justice Blackmun
wrote an additional separate concurring judgment. Justice Stevens wrote a separate
concurrence with whom Justices White and Blackmun joined as to Part I.
6

As one scholar put it: "There is near universal agreement now, as there was not in
1919 or 1954, that political dissent may not be subject to the coercive power of the state.
But beyond that core commitment, the consensus dissipates." Kathleen M. Sullivan, The
FirstAmendment Wars, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1992, at 36.
7

R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2551.

8

id. at 2556.

9

d. at 2562.
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way. Second, the significance of the divided opinion is that the concurring
Justices leave open the possibility that a hate speech law could pass First
Amendment analysis. Treating overbreadth as the key problem in the city's
ordinance, Justices White, Stevens, O'Connor and Blackmun leave open to
legislators the option of a more narrowly tailored prohibition of hate speech.
In contrast, Justice Scalia's majority opinion leaves legislators no options at all.
The first concurrence, from Justice White, attacks Justice Scalia's opinion on
three grounds. The first is a procedural issue of little significance.1 0 Second, it
is argued that Justice Scalia's judgment has the effect of undermining the
categorical approach that has measured the reach of the free speech
guarantee.11 The categorical approach dates back (at least) to the claims made
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire12 that "certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech" are simply not covered by the free speech
guarantee. 13 These classes include: defamation, obscenity, and fighting
words. 14 Justice White's point in this attack is that Justice Scalia's
reshaping/manipulation of Chaplinsky leads to the ironic result that fighting
words are protected by the First Amendment when the government is too
selective in its prohibition. In contrast, Justice White's interpretation of
Chaplinsky is that R.A.V.'s expression has no First Amendment protection
whatsoever.15
Third, Justice Scalia's opinion has the effect of eviscerating strict scrutiny
review.16 Again the irony is that Justice Scalia had agreed that St. Paul had a
compelling interest in preventing cross burning and that the ordinance
promoted that interest. 17 Yet the regulation remained unconstitutional in the
majority's view. Justice White can only conclude that, in Justice Scalia's scheme,
far-reaching bans of speech have a better chance of survival than narrowly
drawn prohibitions. 18 Such a result is a perversion of traditional free speech
doctrine.
This part of the critique deserves closer attention as it appears that Justice
Scalia's argument is dangerously close to self-destruction. The majority

10justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun, O'Connor and Stevens, thought that
the majority was deprived of the power to decide the case as it did. Id. at 2551 n.2
("[Pietitioner did not present to this Court or the Minnesota Supreme Court anything
approximating the novel theory the majority adopts today.").
11Id. at 2551-53.
12315 U.S. 568 (1942).
13

d. at 571-72.

14

R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2552.

15

d. at 2553.
d. at 2554.

16
17

1d. at 2549.

18

d. at 2554.
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suggests that while fighting words are proscribable, there is a danger in
isolating one subset of fighting words for prohibition.19 More precisely, Justice
Scalia's point is that the greater power to punish fighting words does not
include the lesser power to punish certain subcategories of fighting words.2 0
The danger lies in the viewpoint discrimination that is virtually inevitable
when government selects the subcategories. 21 Thus Justice Scalia finds in the
St. Paul ordinance government interference with the marketplace of ideas. 22
As explained by Justice Scalia, The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul
to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on
disfavored subjects. '2 3 For Justice Scalia government prohibition of some hate
speech becomes analogous to prohibition of flag burning; the government has
no business banning expression simply because it is offensive. 24
However at this point Justice Scalia is confronted with a dilemma; if the
government is forbidden from proscribing subsets of categorically unprotected
speech, won't laws against threatening government officials fail constitutional
muster? Justice Scalia finds a solution to this problem in a "special force"
argument: The reasons why threats of violence are outside the First
Amendment '"avespecial force when applied to the person of the President. 2 5
Thus, threats against the President may legitimately be subject to special
prohibition.
Now another difficulty arises, one which Justice Scalia never addresses
directly. The special force argument can readily be adopted by St. Paul to justify
its ordinance. The argument would be that while all fighting words are bad,
when they are directed against groups that have long suffered discrimination
in this society, they bring extra harm. The groups that most need protection
from fighting words are those who are (and have been) disadvantaged in
society. Thus the reasons why fighting words are bad in general, are
more valid (have "special force") when that speech is directed against "insular

19

R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545.

20

d. at 2545-47. One is tempted to say that no subcategory may be punished, but
Scalia argues that some selectivity is left open to government, as long as viewpoint
discrimination is not involved. Id. To illustrate this point he presents an example that is
so fantastic as to be entirely inconsequential, stating, "We cannot think of any First
Amendment interest that would stand in the way of a State's prohibiting only those
obscene motion pictures with blue-eyed actresses." Id. at 2547.
21

d. at 2546.

22

1d. at 2547.

23

1d.

24

It is surprising that Justice Scalia did not underscore this point by reference to the
classic version of a liberal view of the First Amendment, Justice Robert Jackson's
eloquent defense of dissent in West Virginia v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
25

R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546.
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minorities."2 6 As Justice White put it:. 'The exception swallows the majority's
27
rule."
Justice Scalia does not see "special force" as a double-edged sword. Instead
he prefers to characterize the city's law as selective in a way that "creates the
possibility that the city is seeking to handicap the expression of particular
ideas. '2 8 Nevertheless, it takes little stretch of the imagination to see that laws
against verbal threatening of the President could also be termed as 'seeking to
handicap the expression of particular ideas.'
Leaving aside, for a moment, Justice White's concurrence, the possibility that
all categories of unprotected speech are in essence efforts to 'handicap the
expression of particular ideas' should be considered. At least in the cases of
obscenity, and that class of speech which falls under the clear and present
danger rule,2 9 it would appear that government prohibitions are as much based
on the ideas presented as on the risk of consequential harm. This issue
reappears in Justice Stevens's concurrence and will be examined more closely
in the third part of this paper.
The core of Justice White's critique is well summarized by Justice Blackmun
in a separate concurrence, "[Bly deciding that a State cannot regulate speech
that causes great harm unless it also regulates speech that does not (setting law
and logic on their heads) the Court seems to abandon the categorical approach,
and inevitably to relax the level of scrutiny applicable to content-based laws.' 0
Two more critiques appear in Justice Stevens's concurrence. His first attack
brings attention to Justice Scalia's disdain for content-based restrictions on
speech. This disdain is clearly at odds with the history of First Amendment
interpretation, "[O]ur decisions demonstrate that content-based distinctions,
far from being presumptively invalid, are an inevitable and indispensable
aspect of a coherent understanding of the First Amendment."31 Indeed the
entire categorical approach, which Justice Scalia claims to respect, is built on
government interest in the content of communications.
The final attack addresses Justice Scalia's belief that the ordinance regulates
expression based on viewpoint. Justice Stevens disagrees, pointing out in one
example that both Muslims and Catholics are forbidden from using fighting
words based on the religion of the other. The ordinance is essentially "even
handed."3 2 St. Paul expressed no preference regarding particular religious,

26This term is borrowed from the famous comment of Justice Harlan Stone in United
States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144,152-53 n.4 (1938).
27
R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2556 (White, J., concurring).
28

1d. at 2549.

29

Currently govemed by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 US. 444 (1969).

30

R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2560.

31

id.
at 2563.

32

1d. at 2571.
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racial or gender points of view; instead it prohibited personal attacks based on
an individual's race, gender, etc.
The two concurrences examined here reveal critical weaknesses in the
majority's opinion. Other lines of attack also warrant close consideration. In
the next section I will examine two arguments: one based on the relevance of
Beauharnaisv. Illinois,33 another based on the implications of Posadasde Puerto
Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico.34
Ill.JUSTICE SCALIA'S MAJORrrY OPINION

A. The Beauharnais/ChaplinskyDilemma
One of the many ironies of Justice Scalia's opinion is his approval of, and
apparent reliance on, Beauharnaisv. Illinois as precedent. Beauharnaisappears
twice in the majority opinion. 35 The first instance is in support of the contention
that defamation is a "traditional limitation" on free speech. 36 The second is in
relation to the idea that some categories of speech are not constitutionally
protected. 3 7 Justice Scalia argues that the scope of the defamation exception
(for which Beauharnais is most frequently cited 38) has been narrowed by
subsequent decisions, particularly New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.39 As a result,
"the government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content
discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government."40 Ironically,
the speech at fault in Beauharnais, which was held unprotected, directly
addressed government,4 1 while in R.A.V. the expressive conduct, which St.

33343 U.S. 250 (1952).
34478 U.S. 328 (1986).
35 R.A.V.,
112 S.Ct. at 2543.
361d.
37

1d.
See Jerome O'Callaghan, Pornographyand Group Libel: How to Solve the Hudnut
Problem, 27 NEw ENG. L. REV. 363, 367 (1992).
39376 U.S.254 (1964). Justice Scalia's evaluation of Beauharnaisis more positive than
that of most scholars; many believe Beauharnaisto have been completely eviscerated by
subsequent decisions. See Calvin Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the
FoundationalParadigms of Free Expression, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 103, 141, 166 (1992);
Nicholas Wolfson, Free Speech Theory and Hateful Words, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 25 n.103
38

(1991).
40

R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543.
41Beauhamais circulated a petition demanding action from the Mayor and City
Council of Chicago. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 252. Compared to cross burning,
Beauhamais's expression was quite mild; he accused the black population of being
responsible for various unspecified "rapes, [and] robberies." Id.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss2/4
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Paul was not allowed to regulate, neither addressed nor concerned
government. 42
Even with the New York Times qualification, Justice Scalia's reliance on
Beauharnaismakes little sense in R.A.V. As in many majority opinions that have
paid passing homage to Beauharnais,43 this judgment avoids any detailed
consideration of what Beauharnaisreveals about the limits of free speech. Thus
Justice Scalia, while rejecting on constitutional grounds an ordinance that
prohibited expressive attacks based on an individual's "race, color, creed,
religion or gender,"44 cites in his argument an opinion that upheld a state law
prohibiting libels based on "race, color, creed or religion."45
The group libel statute upheld by Justice Felix Frankfurter's 46 opinion in
Beauharnais is remarkably similar in content and purpose to the St. Paul
ordinance rejected in R.A.V If Justice Scalia believes Beauharnaisis no longer
good law (as several scholars have argued 47) he certainly fails to make that
clear in R.A.V On the contrary, his comments support the validity of
Beauharnais,qualified only by the demands of the New York Times.48

42

R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.

43

See O'Callaghan, supra note 38, at 366-67.

44

R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 292.02).
Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 251. The Illinois Criminal Code section implicated in
Beauharnais stated:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to manufacture,
sell, or offer for sale, advertise or publish, present or exhibit in any public
place in this state any lithograph, moving picture, play, drama or sketch,
which publication or exhibition portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity,
or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion
which said publication or exhibition exposes the citizens of any race, color,
creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive
of breach of the peace or riots....
Id.
46
Justice Scalia is said to have been deeply influenced by Justice Felix Frankfurter.
See Richard A. Brisbin, Jr., The Conservatism ofAntonin Scalia, 105 POL. Sc. Q. 1 (1990).
47
Robert C. Post, CulturalHeterogeneityand Law: Pornography,Blasphemy and the First
Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REV. 297,330 (1988); see also THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 396 (1970); Toni M. Massaro, Equalityand Freedom ofExpression:
The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 WM & MARY L. REV. 211, 219 (1991); Jeffry M. Gamso, Sex
Discriminationand the FirstAmendment: Pornographyand Free Speech, 17 TEX. TECH L. REV.
1577, 1598 (1986); William E. Brigman, Pornographyas Group Libel: The IndianapolisSex
DiscriminationOrdinance,18 IND. L. REV. 479,484-485 (1985). But see O'Callaghan, supra
note 38, at 367; Rhonda G. Hartman, Revitalizing Group Defamamtion as a RemedyforHate
Speech on Campus, 71 OR. L. REV. 855 (1992); Kenneth Lasson, Racial Defamation as Free
Speech: Abusing the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 11 (1985); Note, A
Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, 101 HARV. L. REV. 682 (1988).
48
This qualification presumably requires a strict level of review in libel cases when
the alleged victim is a government official or other public figure.
45
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It is already apparent that neither the fighting words exception, nor the
group libel exception, has been overruled. The resilience of Beauharnais and
Chaplinsky,and the dilemma that they pose in current doctrinal developments,
deserve serious attention. At heart, the Beauharnaisopinion rests on the same
fundamental assertion made in Chaplinsky, that some speech is "of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."49 The only
curtailment of these doctrines occurs through the ramifications of New York
Times. Yet the New York Times opinion restricts the reach of Beauharnaisonly in
those cases where a libel (group or otherwise) addresses public officials.50 This
point was made clear by the Supreme Court in Ferberv. New York, 51 when it
stated, "Leaving aside the special considerations when public officials are the
target, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan ... a libelous publication is not protected
by the Constitution. Beauharnaisv. Illinois...,,52
Nevertheless, First Amendment commentators have been quick to rule
Chaplinsky, and particularly Beauharnais,irrelevant 53 As the prior discussion
illustrates, the Supreme Court has not followed that lead.54 This divergence of
opinion may be explained by a misunderstanding of a seminal work on First
Amendment doctrine. Writing in 1964, Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., argued,
"[Tihe special logic of Chaplinsky,Beauharnaisand Roth may well disappear now
that the Times opinion is on the books." 55 Others have followed that route. 56
The result has been an assumption that, in effect, New York Times overruled sub
silentio Beauharnais(and to some extent Chaplinsky57).

49
5

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.

ONew York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,282-83 (1964).

51458 U.S. 747 (1982).
52
1d. at 763 (citations omitted).
53
See supra note 47. Some prominent constitutional law texts pay scant, or no
attention to these cases. For example, neither case appears in CRAIG DUCAT & HAROLD
CHASE, CONSTITUTIONALINTERPRETATION(5th ed. 1992). Another version of the imagined
demise of Beauharnaisholds that Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966), made all
criminal libel law unconstitutional. See DAVID O'BRiEN, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND

POLmCS 447 (1991).
54 Only Justices Hugo Black and William 0. Douglas have explicitly favored

overruling Beauharnais,see A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205,214 (1964).
55Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note On The "CentralMeaningOf The
FirstAmendment", 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191, 218.
56

See supra note 47.
5 Some commentators argue that Chaplinsky has been so crippled that its interment
is long overdue. See Note, The Demise ofthe ChaplinskyFightingWords Doctrine, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 1129, 1130 (1993). Others believe modification of Chaplinsky can ensure its
vitality. See MichaelJ. Mannheimer, The FightingWords Doctrine,93 COLUM. L. REV. 1527,
7

1529,1571 (1993).
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss2/4
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A closer reading of Professor Kalven indicates that such a conclusion is not
justified. By "special logic," Professor Kalven referred to an approach, evident
in Justice Frank Murphy's Chaplinsky reasoning, that dichotomized all speech
for First Amendment purposes. 58 On the one hand were categories of speech
that the guarantee protected (political, religious, etc.), and on the other hand
were categories that were not protected. 59 The latter could not even be called
speech for First Amendment purposes; they included defamation, obscenity,
and fighting words. 60 Because these were not within "the freedom" guaranteed
by the First Amendment, no First Amendment test (e.g., clear and present
danger) need be applied to legislation proscribing them.61 That logic, as
Professor Kalven predicted,6 2 is undeniably absent from First Amendment
decisions after New York Times. However, Professor Kalven does not believe that
the outcome in Chaplinsky,Beauharnais,and Roth must now be doubted.63 Using
obscenity as an example, he states, "Had the Times case preceded Roth, for
example, Roth could not have been written the way it was, although the
decision might have been the same."64 Thus the impact of New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan is significant in terms of the premises used by the Supreme Court
when addressing a First Amendment claim. New York Times does not per se
claim that defamation, fighting words and obscenity are presumably protected
by the First Amendment. The New York Times decision clearly allows
government the power, albeit carefully circumscribed power, to attack libels
and fighting words.65
Justice Scalia in R.A.V. concedes this point, stating "[O]ur decisions since the
1960's have narrowed the scope of the traditional categorical exceptions for
defamation."66 He then acknowledges that Chaplinsky and Beauharnaiscannot
be ignored because "a limited categorical approach has remained an important
part of our First Amendment jurisprudence."6 7 At least on its surface the
majority opinion supports the fighting words exception, just as decisions of the

58

See Kalven, supra note 55, at 217.

59

1d.

6OSee Chaplinsky,

315 U.S. at 571.

61Kalven, supra note 55, at 217.
62

1d. at 218.

63

1d.
64Id.
65

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-71 (1964).

66

R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543.

67Id.
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1980s have supported other exceptions through explicit reference to
Beauharnais.68
Beauharnaisand Chaplinskyhave survived the doctrinal shifts of the last three
decades for at least two reasons. First, the ease of application of a categorical
approach is especially attractive to a Supreme Court prone to standardized
tests. Second, the fundamental dilemma that permeates all free speech cases is
captured precisely in Justice Murphy's claim that the benefits of some speech
are so few that they are easily outweighed by more significant social interests. 69
This assertion rejects the absolutism that most agree would make First
Amendment adjudication, not to mention democracy itself, impossible. 70 At
the same time it promotes the intuitively attractive idea that only significant
social interests can justify suppression of speech. 'Order and morality' remain
perennial concerns in the business of government. Much of the content of
democratic debate, of public policy making, and of political life in general is
about the specific application of ideals of order and morality. In this light it is
of little surprise that the contours of the First Amendment should be curtailed
by the same criteria. 7 1 While labels, doctrines, paradigms and methodologies
vary in First Amendment jurisprudence over time, the essence of all those shifts
involves a determination of which order, which morality, will measure the
reach of a free speech claim.
This is not to say that Chaplinsky is the better, or best, way of handling First
Amendment claims. It obviously raises a troublesome specter of judges either,
a) applying their own elite vision of order and morality, or
b) deferring to a popular majority's vision of order and morality.
Nevertheless, what Chaplinsky reflects so well is that the First Amendment
makes such dangers inevitable. A First Amendment jurisprudence
independent of contemporary understanding of order and morality is
ultimately a contradiction in terms.
Thus Justice Robert Jackson's famous claim that no official "can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of
opinion"-makes for a fine, even romantic, ideal, while at the same it

68 See Bose v.

Consumer's Union, 466 U.S. 485,504 (1984) (libel); New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747,763 (1982) (child pornography); Central Hudson v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 US. 557, 592 (1980) (commercial speech).
69
Justice Frank Murphy wrote that fighting words are unprotected because they are
"of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky, 315
U.S. at 572.
7
OSee Jerome O'Callaghan, Free Speech: Dimensions and Limits in LAW AND POLMCS:
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 226 (ed. David Schultz 1994); JOHN BRIGHAM, CIVIL LIBERTIES

AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

40 (1984).

71From a comparative perspective it is worth noting that under the Constitution of
the Republic of Ireland the "right of citizens to express freely their convictions and
opinions" is guaranteed, "subject to public order and morality." IRE. CONST. art. 40.6.1.i.
I expect many other nations attach similar caveats.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss2/4
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substantially misses the poinL72 The Schenck v. United States73 /Brandenburg v.
Ohio74 clear and present danger test,75 and the obscenity test from Miller v.
Ca/ifornia,76 both reveal and support the power of government officials to
determine the orthodox.
Ultimately Beauharnaisand Chaplinsky remain significant developments in
the Supreme Court's understanding of the First Amendment. They create an
unmistakable tension when placed next to more liberal interpretations of free
speech such as West Virginia v. Barnette77 and Texas v. Johnson.78 One of the
ironies of the R.A. V opinion is that it supports, at least nominally, Beauharnais
and Chaplinsky while achieving a result more ideologically in keeping with
Barnette and Johnson. In sum, it is a perversion of Beauharnaisto use it to help
defeat the St Paul ordinance. Similarly it is a perverse use of Chaplinsky79 that
results in government's inability to punish cross burning for its hate speech
elements.
B. The PosadasArgument
In Posadasde PuertoRico Associates v. Tourism Co. of PuertoRico,80 the Supreme
Court upheld the power of government to restrict advertising for some forms
of gambling on the island of Puerto Rico. 8 1 The majority's focus was on
a) the nature of the speech involved (commercial) and
b) the power of a local legislature to protect the welfare of its citizens.82
The Posadasdecision supports government creation of two double standards:
the first gave Puerto Ricans less access to information than citizens on the
mainland; the second put advertisements for casino gambling beneath
advertisements for other forms of gambling. 83

72

West Virginia v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943).

73249 U.S. 47 (1919).
74395 U.S. 444 (1969).
75249 U.S. at 52; 395 U.S. at 447-48.
76413 U.S. 15 (1973).
77

1d.

78491 U.S. 397 (1989).
79
Recall that Chaplinsky developed this test for the reach of the First Amendment,
that unprotected speech is speech that is of "such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.

80478 U.S. 328 (1986).
81

1d. at 348.

82

1d. at 340-42.

83

1d.
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Posadasis mentioned only once in Scalia's majority opinion. 84 However even
this reference is ironic, as Posadascertainly strengthens the hand of government
in the regulation of speech. Just as the Puerto Rican double standards were
based on legislative concern for general welfare,85 so too was St. Paul's double
standard (i.e., some, not all, fighting words were singled out for punishment).86
On Justice Scalia's side, however, is the fact that commercial speech has
consistently been viewed as a unique category for First Amendment
purposes. 87 In general the Supreme Court has tolerated more government
power over commercial speech than over other forms of speech. 88
A comparison of Posadas and R.A.V raises some curious problems. This is
not an instance of comparing 'pure speech' to some lesser form of
communication. Recall that R.A.V. engaged in expressiveconduct.89 If R.A.V. had
made a racist speech, the issue would have been substantially different in that
the St. Paul ordinance would not even apply.90 Thus we have expressive
conduct compared to commercial speech-which of the two should rank
higher in a hierarchy of protectable speech is not immediately clear. The
question becomes more intriguing when one looks to the particulars. Should
casino advertisements be less deserving of First Amendment protection than a
cross-buning9 l on the property of a black family in the dead of night?
Even if one concludes that commercial speech in general is a lower priority
than expressive conduct, one must ask whether it matters what the content is,

or what the topic is in expressive conduct. So, for example, would it make sense
to say that commercial speech (as in, say, a billboard) is ranked beneath
expressive conduct the topic of which is a commercial transaction and the
content of which is essentially an advertisement? 92

84

R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542.

85

Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341.
See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541-42.

86

87See MALCOM FEELEY & SAMUEL KRiSLOV, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 474 (2d ed. 1990).
88

See O'Brien, supra note 53, at 482-484.

89

See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.

90

For the text of the ordinance see supra note 4.
The incident that brought R.A.V. to court was in fact part of a more widespread
pattern of harassment and intimidation of a black family newly arrived in a white
neighborhood. They endured tire slashing, racial epithets hurled at their nine year-old
son and a vandalized car window. Charles R. Lawrence m, Crossburningand the Sound
ofSilence: AntisubordinationTheory & the FirstAmendment,37 VILL. L. REv. 787,787 (1992).
92
This hypothetical may appear bizarre, but compares well to Justice Scalia's
hypothetical of a government prohibition of only those obscene movies that feature
blue-eyed actresses. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
91
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To determine the appropriate place of a particular instance of expressive
conduct in a hierarchy 93 of First Amendment speech, one should examine its
topic and content. 94 It should come as no surprise that the best known examples
96
95
of protected expressive conduct, Tinker v. Des Moines and Texas v. Johnson,
97
both involved a political topic and overt political content. Likewise a
prominent example of expressive conduct that fared poorly with the Court
involved a message of eroticism.98 Thus the topic and content of R.A.V.'s
expressive conduct need examination.
Put it in a light most favorable to the defendant, the topic was race relations.
(In another light, it was hate.) The content surely was the equivalent of a verbal
threat. It is difficult, if not impossible, to interpret the burning cross without
using the word intimidation. As explained by one scholar, "Remarks whose
dominant object is to hurt and humiliate, not to assert facts or values, have very
limited expressive value."99 Given that threats against the life, liberty or
property of another are often prohibited by state or local law, it is difficult to
see how R.A.V.'s expressive conduct must necessarily rank above commercial
speech in degree of First Amendment protection. If anything the result should
be the opposite; advertisements for legitimate commercial transactions are
deserving of greater First Amendment protection than threats based on racial
animus.
In sum, the argument that no comparison can be made between expressive
conduct and commercial speech is fundamentally flawed and serves only to
avoid another measure by which the R.A.V reasoning appears truly perverse.
The St. Paul ordinance is, like the regulation upheld in Posadas, an effort to
promote the 'health, safety and welfare" of its residents and the city's interest
is certainly "substantial."10 0 R.A.V. does not satisfactorily explain why
government has less power to prohibit physical threats than it has to ban the
distribution of truthful information in the form of an advertisement.
93

The very existence of separate standards for commercial speech regulation
presupposes such a hierarchy.
94
A hierarchy of First Amendment speech cateogies will inevitably depend on
topic/content classifications, see, e.g., WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATION OF THE

FIRST AMENDMENT 41-42 (1984).
95393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing of black arm bands as a protest of U.S. policy in
Vietnam).
96491 U.S. 397 (1989) (burning of an American flag as a protest of Reagan
Administration policies).
97
See 393 U.S. at 504-05; 491 U.S. at 399-400.
98

Bames v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 562-65 (1991) (nude dancing as conduct
expressive of erotism and sexuality).
99
Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RuTCERS L.
REV. 287, 298 (1990).

10OPosadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328,341
(1986).
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IV. FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS

Justice Scalia's most prominent theme in R.A.V is the accusation that the
government has chosen to display favoritism in the realm of speech, that "The
First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on
those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects. In its practical
operation, moreover, the ordinance goes even beyond mere content
discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination."10 1 Because fighting words
that do not involve race, creed, etc. are ignored by the law,' Justice Scalia
concludes that the viewpoints of some are given an unfair advantage, licensing
"one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow
Marquis of Queensbury Rules."102
This line of thinking raises two immediate questions: i) whether the
ordinance actually punishes one side of a debate, and ii) whether punishing
one side (i.e. violating a neutrality command) is at odds with First Amendment
doctrine?
To answer the first question one must look at, and beyond, the facts of R.A.V.
It is obvious that no "debate" was occurring on the front lawn of that suburban
home in the "predawn hours."103 Even if R.A.V had engaged in direct speech,
it strains reason to call it a "debate" when one side is either expected, or known,
to be asleep. Thus the particular application of the ordinance infringed on no
debate.
In other circumstances the ordinance might be applied where two or more
sides do face off in debate. Even then, however, the ordinance indicates a
government preference only when it comes to non-verbal expression of hate.104
A debate the point of which is the non-verbal expression of hate between the
participants, can hardly be counted as a "debate" in any meaningful sense. A
debate the point of which is something more substantial is surely at a point of
derailment when non-verbal expressions of hate are vented.
Consider this dialogue:
Attorney 1: And don't be telling other lawyers to shut up. That
isn't your goddamned job, fat boy.
Attorney 2: Well that's not your job, Mr. Hairpiece.
Witness: As I said before, you have an incipient101112 S. Ct. at 2547 (citations omitted).
102

d. at 2548.

10 3

The cross burning incident was one in an ongoing series of efforts to intimidate a
solitary black family in a predominantly white neighborhood. See supranote 91.
104Recall the specific language of the then ordinance: "'Whoever places on public or
private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including,
but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor."' R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 292.02 (1990)).
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss2/4
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Attorney 1: What do you want to do about it asshole?
Attorney 2: You're not going to bully this guy.
105
Attorney 1: Oh you big tub of shit, sit down.
If that exchange counts as part of a deposition in any real sense, then perhaps
R.A.V.'s expression counts as a contribution to some debate. In both cases it
takes an enormous leap of the imagination to suggest that something other than
simple intimidation is involved. As Justice White phrases it in his concurrence,
"[Bly characterizing fighting words as a form of 'debate'. . . the majority
legitimates hate speech as a form of public discussion."106
Here lies another important error in Justice Scalia's opinion. He sees
viewpoint discrimination as the effect of the ordinance. In fact, the ordinance
is, on its face, concerned with the topic of "debate", not the point of view of the
speaker. So at least at first glance the ordinance involves not viewpoint
favoritism, but content favoritism. Professor Kagan, in a perceptive analysis of
R.A.V., reaches the same conclusion; 10 7 however, she also concludes that the
practical effect of the ordinance will be viewpoint discrimination:
The St. Paul ordinance, it is true, handicaps both sides (and therefore
neither side) when Jews and Catholics, whites and blacks scream slurs
based on religion or race at each other. But surely race-based fighting
words occur (indeed, surely they usually occur) in something other
than this double-barrelled context. In most instances, race-based
fighting words will be all on one side, because only racists use
race-based fighting words, and racists usually do not assail only each
other. When the dispute is of this kind, the government effectively
favors a side in barring only race-based fighting words. To put the
point another way, if a law prohibiting the display of swastikas takes
10 8
a side, no less does a law that punishes as well the burning of crosses.
On this basis, Professor Elena Kagan concludes that Justice Scalia, though he
tends to confuse viewpoint neutrality with content neutrality, could fairly
assail the ordinance for its viewpoint favoritism. 109 Yet this analysis is far from
convincing. To begin, no empirical data on the actual application of the law has
been marshaled to show which viewpoints were favored and which were not.
Second, if it is true that most racial insults will all be on one side (presumably
pro-white) that only means that there are more speakers on one side of the
105

Bar Wars, HARPER's MAGAZINE, Jan. 1993, at 32 (excerpted from the transcript of a

deposition).
106

R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2553-54 (White, J., concurring).
107Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion,1992 Sup. CT. REV. 29,
68-69.
108
109

1d. at 70-71.
d. at 70.
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"debate" than on the other. The fact that white racists can intimidate through
numbers hardly indicates that the government only opposes pro-white racial
slurs. Third, if it is true that most racial insults will all be on one side, and that
the other side relies on non-racial fighting words (can this really be a likely
occurrence?), then what favoritism has been demonstrated?
Consider a management-union dispute in which one side is prone to using
racial slurs and the other is not. St. Paul would punish the racists, but would it
thereby reveal a preference on the labor issue? Even if all of one side were
racists, would the government thereby have favored one side on the labor issue
or altered the labor dispute itself? Why should it matter at all to St. Paul which
side relied on racial slurs? Fourth, it is certainly plausible that an anti-swastika
law shows viewpoint as well as content preference. But recall that the St. Paul
ordinance banned all symbols including "but not limited to" 110 swastikas and
burning crosses when they were used to arouse anger or alarm "on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion or gender."11 The broad sweep of the ordinance
undermines the claim that some viewpoints would necessarily fare better than
others.
To state the obvious, a social interest in order and morality is furthered by
minimizing incidents where debates degenerate into 'hate-fests'. Justice
Stevens' evaluation agrees:
In a battle between advocates of tolerance and advocates of
intolerance the ordinance does not prevent either side from hurling
fighting words at the other on the basis of their conflicting ideas, but
it does bar both sides from hurling such words
on the basis of the
112
target's "race, color, creed, religion or gender.
Just as it is hard to believe that R.A.V.'s acts actually contributed, or even were
intended to contribute, to a debate, it is equally difficult to swallow the peculiar
notion that the St. Paul ordinance somehow could impoverish debate. Thus
Justice Scalia's concern about viewpoints driven from the marketplace seems
profoundly beside the point. Only the truly naive could describe this decision
as one that "reaffirmed a rule against government orthodoxy."113
V. JUSTICE SCALIA'S ERRATIC STANDARDS

One of the stranger aspects of R.A.V. is that Justice Scalia's concern for
political debate, in this case, causes him to ponder, with alarm, the "specter that
the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the

1lOSee supra

note 104 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 292.02).

11id.
112
R.A.V., 112 S.Ct. at 2571.
113 Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 44 (1992).
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marketplace."11 4 Even if R.A.V had raised this specter, there remain serious

issues relating to the marketplace theory that Justice Scalia must surely want
to avoid. As put by one commentator.
The marketplace of ideas! Do we appreciate enough the
revolutionary daring of that conception? At one bold stroke it identifies
the deliberative and the bargaining arts, turns the scientist into a
businessman, the sage into the salesman. This is the most significant
triumph of a business civilization. Or it would be, if it did not ensure

disaster. For, unfortunately, we need the product of deliberation, and,
however difficult it may be for us to recapture the sense of difference,
and bargaining are not the same, neither in process nor in
deliberating
11 5
result.
Justice Scalia's faith in a marketplace of ideas is also ironic, as his position in

other First Amendment cases indicates skepticism about free trade for
speech. 116 It has already been observed that he has found several values that
outweigh free speech rights, including "the preservation of the special status
of government employment, the protection of communities from pandering,
the maintenance of the electoral process, the protection of captive audiences
from unwanted speech, and the fostering of education. n 7 For reasons not yet
explained by Justice Scalia, the protection of individuals from harassment and
intimidation (based on their race, creed, etc.) has not made that list.11 8

114112 S. Ct. at 2545 (quoting Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Board,
502 US. 105 (1992)).
11
5JOSEPH TussMAN, OBLIGATION AND THE BODY POLITIC 104 (1960).
ll 6Analysis of Justice Scalia's record in the D.C. Circuit and on the Supreme Court
(through the 1991 term) reveals a voting pattern dominated by votes against free speech
claims.
Of all areas of the First Amendment, Justice Scalia has been most
sympathetic toward free speech claims. He has voted to uphold free
speech claims in eleven of twenty-nine (37.9%) cases. However, his
support for free speech claims has not been spread uniformly across
all speech categories. In the area of pure speech, he opposed free
speech claims 75% of the time, and he opposed all First Amendment
claims in the area of obscenity. Yet he only opposed free speech claims
involving expressive conduct 28.6% of the time.
David Schultz, Justice Antonin Scalia'sFirstAmendment Jurisprudence: Free Speech, Press
and Association Decisions, 9 J.L. & POL. 515, 526 (1993).
117David Schultz, Justice Antonin Scalia's FirstAmendment Jurisprudence: Free Speech,
Press and Association Decisions,9 J.L. & POL.515, 545 (1993).
118
A similarpoint is evident in the contrastbetween Justice Scalia's approach in R.A.V.
and his approach in Employment Div. Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990):
[In providing such strong protection for the First Amendment [in
R.A.V.], Justice Scalia seemed to ignore many of the pillars of his own
jurisprudence. Take for example his professed belief in the political
process ...[In Smith] Justice Scalia rejected a First Amendment
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Another irony lies in Justice Scalia's willingness to see expression of some
value, expression worth protection, in R.A.V's actions, while five years earlier
he found a speaker's verbal assertion of support for a hypotheticalassassination
of the President to be completely unprotected.119 This contrast stands out in
the record of one who has written, "The only checks on the arbitrariness of
federal judges are the insistence upon consistency and the application of the
teachings of the mother of consistency, logic. ' 120
One final irony evident in this case concerns the equality arguments that are
frequently used by proponents of government restriction of hate speech. 12 1
Typically they assert that true equality, the kind that is denied by acts of
intimidation, is a prerequisite to real freedom of speech.122 However, Justice
Scalia, by requiring that all fighting words be treated alike, uses an equality
argument to defeat the St. Paul ordinance.
At its most fundamental level R.A.V. raises the question whether punishing
one side of a debate 123 violates First Amendment principles. The most that can
be said in response is that established First Amendment principles are
notoriously ambivalent. On one hand we find decisions in the Barnette-Johnson
vein that espouse a government disinterested in the extreme. 124 On the other
hand, the very existence of categories of unprotected speech (a fact that Justice
Scalia does not dispute 125) indicates that evenhandedness is not the utmost

challenge to a state's right to prohibit Native Americans from using
peyote in their worship.... Despite the First Amendment, he stated
at that time "values that are protected against government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby
vanished from the political process... It may fairly be said that
leaving accommodation to political process will place at a relative
disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged
in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government
must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law
unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all
laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs." Such deference
to the political process is notably absence [sic] in R.A.V.
Wendy E. Parmet &Judith Olans Brown, Scaliaand Free Speech, NAT'L L. J., July 27,1992,
at 18.
119
See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378,397 (1987); see also Schultz, supra note 118,
at 532.
120Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canardsof ContemporaryLegal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 581, 588 (1989).
12 1
See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 47, at 230.
122

1d.
123 Assuming, arguendo, that debates were subject to the ordinance.
124

See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,24 (1971); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
563-64 (1968).
125
"[O]ur decisions since the 1960's have narrowed the scope of the traditional
categorical exceptions for defamation." R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss2/4

18

1994]

FREE SPEECH BY THE LIGHT OF A BURNING CROSS

233

priority. The debate, discussion, consideration, and examination by the body
26
politic of what is obscene has been hampered by Miller v. California.1
Consideration of radical alternatives to our democratic structures has been
restricted by decisions such as Schenck v. United States 12 7 and its progeny. 12 8
The categorical approach itself informs us that government can and will create
barriers around the marketplace of ideas.
Even defamation law, it can be argued, reveals a government that
discriminates against content. The argument 129 suggests that in defamation
cases the government obviously discriminates against some speech on the basis
of content. Further, some viewpoints are preferred over others, such as false
unflattering (injurious) comments which are punished, unlike false flattering
(non-injurious) comments which are not punished. The difference between the
two depends in part on viewpoint and content. Finally, the very act of allowing
a jury or judge to determine what is a false unflattering comment will inevitably
lead to content discrimination. One can only conclude that First Amendment
principles do not consistently favor neutrality130 toward purveyors in the
market, nor do they show indifference to the content of debate, as stated by
Professor Kagan:
Exceptions to the rule [of viewpoint neutrality] exist, although the
Court rarely has seen fit to acknowledge them as such; in a number of
areas of First Amendment law (and especially when so called
low-value speech is implicated), the Court breezily has
ignored both
13
more and less obvious forms of viewpoint preference. 1
R.A.V. is a particularly interesting decision for many reasons, not the least of
which is the fact that it is the only majority opinion authored by Justice Scalia

126 To the extent that Miller allows government restriction of obscenity, the public is
denied an opportunity to decide for itself the value of obscene material.
127249 U.S. 47 (1919).
128 Schenck was quickly followed by a decision which upheld the imprisonment of one
of the most prominent Socialist Party leaders of the day. See Debs v. United States, 249
U.S. 211 (1919). In effect part of the Socialist Party platform had been declared illegal.
Similarly, the court's decision to uphold convictions in Dennis v. United States, 341 US.
494 (1951), discouraged advocacy that lies at the core of the Communist movement.
1291 am indebted to Professor Steven Shiffrin of Cornell Law School for the
development of this argument.
130According to one First Amendment scholar, "No principle has been articulated
more consistently in First Amendment law than the doctrine that legislation affecting
speech may not be based on disapproval of its content." Floyd Abrams, Hate Speech: The
Present Implications of a Historical Dilemma, 37 VILL. L. REV. 743, 749 (1992). If that
proposition were true, no obscenity statute could withstand constitutional scrutiny. In
contrast, the Supreme Court has expended a great deal of energy explaining how
obscenity statutes need not offend the Bill of Rights.
13 1

Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hate Speech and PornographyafterY.A.V., 60 U. CHI. L.
REV. 873,876 (1993).
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that upholds a free speech claim. 132 Indeed analysis of Justice Scalia's record
shows a pronounced antagonism toward free speech claims in general:
[While Scalia's participation in certain high profile decisions striking
down flag burning or cross burning laws as unconstitutional have
given him the reputation as a defender of free speech, press and
association, he is not. In the forty-six identified cases involving these
freedoms, he has voted against them thirty-three times...
and he has
133
voted against the press in ten of eleven decisions.
Justice Scalia has already been criticized for his sporadic use of principle to
suit his preferred causes.1 34 'When the methodology has to give in order for
the merits to go as Justice Scalia wants, it gives." 135 He has been criticized for
his "rigid formalism 136 and his deference to the powers established in the
status quo. 13 7 "Justice Scalia's 'neutral principles' are no more neutral than
anyone else's ... [they] often result in a lack of judicial protection for the poor,
the powerless and the unpopular."138 With regard to RA. V in particular, it has
also been argued that he is blind to the unique relevance of other Constitutional
guarantees. As Professor Akhil Amar has commented, burning crosses may
"cease to be part of the freedom of speech protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, and instead constitute badges of servitude that may be
prohibited under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments." 13 9
VI. CONCLUSION: SCHIZOPHRENIA

The essence of the problem raised in many recent First Amendment cases,
and most apparent in R.A.V., lies in a two-track First Amendment doctrine.

132This remained true as of Spring, 1993. See Schultz, supra note 118, at 537.
133

/d. at 519.

34

1 Jeffrey Rosen, The Leader of the Opposition,THE NEw REPuBLIc, Jan. 18,1993, at 20-21.
135 Peter Edelman, Justice Scalia's Jurisprudenceand the Good Society Shades of Justice
Frankfurterandthe HarvardHitParadeofthe 1950's, 12 CARDOzoL. REv. 1799,1800 (1991).

136Larry Kramer, Judicial Asceticism, 12 CARDozo L. REv. 1789, 1798 (1991) ("[Tihe
central theme of Justice Scalia's jurisprudence is that justice is not his business. His
business is to enforce objective rules. If these are unjust, it is up to others-Congress,
the states, We the People-to change them.").
137
'7ustice Scalia's devaluation of the past... follows from the root principle of his
jurisprudence-that the strong are entitled to rule. All of us should remember, however,
the fate prophesied for those who live by the sword." Robert A. Burt, Precedentand
Authority in Antonin Scalia'sJurisprudence,12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1685,1697 (1991).

138 Edelman, supra note 136, at 1801.

139 Akhil R. Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 124,126 (1992). That argument raises intriguing questions about the portions of the
ordinance that were aimed at hate speech based on gender and religion.
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These tracks 14° were laid at least 50 years ago; they reveal a "tension between
robust protection of the offensive expression and protection of the dignity and
physical integrity of potential victims of such expression.

14 1

The first approach

emphasizes the anti-majoritarian nature of the free speech guarantee, the
minimal role of government in any public debate, and the courts' duty to ensure
that government meets the highest standard before a restriction of
speech/expression will be allowed. 142 This is not just anti-censorship, it is

anti-chilling effect and fundamentally anti-government. Given the liberalism
of the Warren Court (and to a lesser extent the Burger Court), it is not surprising
14 3
that this approach was dominant in the 1960s and 1970s.
The second approach emphasizes the purposes of the text, the limited reach
of the term "speech" itself, and the countervailing interests in order, morality
and security.144 The victories of this approach may be fewer but they remain
146
significant. 145 Obviously Chaplinsky and Beauharnaisare prime examples.
What Justice Scalia's majority opinion attempts in R.A. V. is an integration of
both tracks, which explains why the reasoning is so convoluted, if not
perverse. 147 His effort to integrate both strands of divergent analyses is
ultimately unconvincing. As one scholar put it, "Doctrine... yields no clear
answer to whether the first amendment protects speech that is as
confrontational and potentially destructive of human dignity and social
solidarity as is hate speech. "148 Justice Scalia's judgment in effect tells the
legislature that it can advance a social interest in order and morality with
fighting-word laws only when those laws are neutral. If Justice Scalia's concern
is content-neutrality, that position is ultimately nonsensical. Fighting-words

140For a full examination of the philosophical underpinnings of this dichotomy, see
Massaro, supra note 47.
14 1

Massaro, supra note 47, at 212.

142

Devotees of this approach are inclined, like their counterparts, to see it as the only
free speech tradition. See Amar, supranote 140, at 133.
143
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,414-15 (1989); Cohen v. California, 430 U.S.
15, 24 (1971); Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444,447-48 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,563-64 (1968); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,269-70 (1964); West Virginia v. Barmette, 319 U.S. 624,641-42
(1943).
144See JOHN BRIGHAM, CIvIL LIBERTIEs AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 40-76 (1984).
14 5

Others that would be included in this category include, Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S.
103 (1990); Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
(1986); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367(1968).
146 From this perspective it appears that supporters of the flag-burning opinion cannot
consistently criticize R.A.V.
14 7
1t has been suggested that Scalia's opinion relies heavily on a brief submitted by
the "libertarian Center for Individual Rights." Rosen, supra note 135, at 27.
148 Massaro, supra note 47, at 221.
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laws must always discriminate on the basis of content. If his concern is
viewpoint-neutrality, it is misplaced. The St.Paul ordinance attacked content,
irrespective of viewpoint. The boundary that Justice Scalia wants to set for the
fighting words exception is at odds with the very foundation of the exception
itself: The government's legitimate interest in order and morality.
To suggest, as did Justice White, that Justice Scalia's analysis is "transparently
wrong" is not to argue that the St Paul ordinance will be an effective tool against
hate speech or its harms. It may well be the case that the ordinance will be used
most often to harass groups that in Justice White's words, "have historically
been subjected to discrimination," 149 as well as hate speech.SO In any case,
effectiveness does not guarantee constitutionality, nor vice-versa.
The categorical approach that is the source of the one true debate in R.A.V.
also has its weaknesses. One problem is that ultimately it begs the question,
where is the containment principle? At what point do we know that the list is
complete? What is to prevent the Supreme Court from creating a simple ad hoc
list of disfavored expression at random? Indeed the Court's willingness to find
good reasons for restricting freedom of speech brings to mind the criticism once
leveled at the clear and present danger test by Alexander Meiklejohn, that "The
court has interpreted the dictum that Congress shall not abridge freedom of
speech by defining the conditions under which such abridging is allowable.
Congress, we are now told, is forbidden to destroy our freedom except when
it finds it advisable to do so."151
To a cynic, the restrictions that have been placed on the First Amendment
reveal the essential force of political expediency. The victims of the clear and
present danger test 152 were the Socialist and Communist parties. A Supreme
Court sensitive to the wishes of the majority created a child pornography
exception that bore little or no relation to established First Amendment
doctrine. 153 In sum, it can be argued that the categorical approach, though
intuitively coherent (especially from an original intent perspective), in practice
has been an excuse for the creation of an ad hoc blacklist reflecting majoritarian
pressures.

149

R.A.V., 112 S.Ct. at 334.

150

"Bans on hate speech may have perverse effects: they may replicate the very
marginalization that they are meant to subvert, carrying a subtext that the victims cannot
talk back for themselves." Sullivan, supranote 6, at 40; seealso Nadine Strossen, Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?1990 DUKE L. J. 484, 556; Massaro, supra
note 47, at 226.
151ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT 29
(1948).
152

Included in this category are the subsequent mutations of the test, up to and
including the Brandenburgdecision.
153

See the critique of Justice White's opinion in The Supreme Court,1981 Term, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 62, 145 (1982).
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This article began with a quote from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. It is
fitting that it should end with a comment that describes his approach to free
speech cases. This comment captures well the conundrum that hate speech
cases present in First Amendment doctrine:
What matters for a legal system is what words do, not what they say,
and, therefore, the law should only direct its attention to the use of
words which do something illegal, not their use to say something.
Looking at the words alone, instead of at what difference they make in
the full set of circumstances in which they are uttered, is simply
insufficient to determine their significance for a legsystem generally,
or for first amendment adjudication, in particular.

154 Edward J. Bloustein, Holmes: His FirstAmendment Theory and His PragmatistBent,

40 RUTGERS L. REv. 283,299 (1988).
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